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The acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Islamic Republic of Iran would be an extremely destabiliz-
ing event in the Middle East. It would very likely lead to the nuclearization of the region, starting 
most probably with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Saudi Arabia. Such an arms race would 
bring the threat of nuclear war into one of the most volatile areas of the world, and it would bring 
nuclear weapons into one of the densest concentrations of Islamist terrorist groups outside of the 
already-nuclearized South Asia. The West, indeed the world, cannot look upon such a development 
calmly. 
It is not at all clear, however, whether the international community or the United States alone will 
prevent the Islamic Republic of Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, or that the Iranian regime itself 
will decide not to acquire them. It behooves the United States, therefore, to consider the likelihood of 
deterring this regime from using nuclear weapons in order to implement a Cold War–like policy of 
containment. The United States must also consider the degree to which the possession of nuclear 
weapons would make it more difficult to deter or counteract conventional and unconventional mili-
tary operations by the Islamic Republic in the region or around the world.  
It is impossible to make a convincing argument that the Islamic Republic is structurally designed 
to facilitate containment—that is, it cannot be said with any certainty that deterring a nuclear Iran 
from using its weapons will be possible. On the contrary, the opacity of the regime and the potential 
fluidity of its structure, not to mention its leading personnel, make it impossible to demonstrate that 
future governments of the Islamic Republic will likely be deterrable, even if the United States could 
be confident that the current one is. It can, however, be said with a high degree of confidence that it 
will be more difficult to deter a nuclear Iran from undertaking conventional and unconventional war-
fare, including terrorism. 
Deterring Whom? 
The first challenge in considering the prospects for deterring the use of nuclear weapons by the Is-
lamic Republic is determining who, exactly, would control them. The likeliest scenario is as follows: 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) would probably have physical control over the 
weapons and maintain the personnel and infrastructure to fire them on command. The IRGC would 
most likely establish an elite unit for this purpose. The supreme leader would almost certainly have 
sole authority to order such a launch. His order would probably go directly to the IRGC commander, 
or possibly directly to the commander of the nuclear forces, bypassing the IRGC chain of command 
entirely. It is unlikely that there would be any check on the supreme leader’s ability to order the use of 
the Islamic Republic’s nuclear weapons. It is also unlikely that the president of the Islamic Republic 
would be in the nuclear chain of command (since he does not appear to be in the conventional chain 
of command, after all). 
From the standpoint of deterring the Islamic Republic’s use of nuclear weapons, this is the most 
optimistic scenario. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appears to place an extremely high 
premium on regime preservation. He does not appear to share the apocalyptic visions of President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or extremist clerics such as Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi. Iranian foreign policy 
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under Khamenei has generally been characterized by cautious aggressiveness similar to that dis-
played by the Soviet Union for most of the Cold War. Such a history suggests that Khamenei may 
pursue policies of brinksmanship (as even the arch-pragmatic Soviet leaders did so), and there is al-
ways the danger of miscalculation in such policies. It also suggests, however, that Khamenei is likely 
to seek to avoid nuclear conflict. 
Yet the Iranian election of 2009 and its aftermath has cast doubt on even this optimistic scenario. 
The Iranian regime has always been opaque, and any discussion about how decisions are made or 
even who makes them is fraught with uncertainty. The fraudulence of the election and Khamenei’s 
unprecedented direct intervention in support of Ahmadinejad have created fissures in the regime and 
generated changes in the balance of the Islamic Republic’s various power blocs. Ahmadinejad and the 
IRGC have gained strength, while the “pragmatist” camp of which Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani 
was a prominent member has been both fractured and weakened. The street demonstrations follow-
ing the election unsettled the regime’s elite profoundly, leading to an immediate crackdown followed 
by a determined effort to ensure that no “velvet revolution” was in the offing. Khamenei replaced the 
commander of the Basij militia (a paramilitary organization reminiscent of the Komsomol) with a 
former Qods Force officer who fought in Lebanon and in Bosnia. President Ahmadinejad’s selection 
of Qods Force founder Ahmad Vahidi as defense minister was another unsettling indicator of the 
possible rise in power not simply of the IRGC, but of the radical element within the IRGC that has 
devoted itself to spreading the revolution abroad. Although Khamenei appears to be reestablishing 
his position as the Green Movement protests are dying down, it is difficult to remain confident that 
Khamenei alone has his hands firmly on the levers of power, or to predict what he might do or who 
might influence him even if he did. 
Khamenei will not always be supreme leader, moreover, and the question of deterring his possible 
successors is more complicated. First, there is the question of the interregnum—who will control the 
Islamic Republic’s nuclear weapons following Khamenei’s death and before the selection of his suc-
cessor? There is no vice supreme leader, after all, and the process of selecting a new one is delibera-
tive and can be slow, especially if Khamenei outlives obvious candidates such as Ayatollah Rafsanjani. 
Possible scenarios include the devolution of control over the nuclear arsenal to the head of the As-
sembly of Experts, as the closest stand-in for the supreme leader in his absence; to the president; to 
the head of the Guardian Council; or to that body in a conciliar fashion. It is highly likely that the Is-
lamic Republic will make arrangements for this obvious contingency in advance, but it is not inevita-
ble that any such arrangements will proceed smoothly upon Khamenei’s death. 
Second, there is the question of Khamenei’s successor. It is impossible to predict now who that 
will be or what views he will hold. Nor is it inevitable that there will be a supreme leader after this 
one. Some Iran experts argue that the institution of the supreme leader, which is not in principle es-
sential to the concept of velayat-e faqih, or “guardianship of the jurisprudent,” that forms the religioi-
deological basis for the regime, may not survive Khamenei. The supreme leader could be replaced by 
a council of clerics, for example, the composition of which it is not possible to predict at all. Others 
argue that the waxing influence of the IRGC itself may threaten meaningful clerical control over the 
Islamic Republic. The president could come to eclipse a future supreme leader or, more easily, clerical 
leadership council and acquire, de facto if not de jure, control over Iranian foreign policy. Statements 
by Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, a strong ally of President Ahmadinejad, that the presidential election 
(and therefore the president) was also an extension of the principle of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of 
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the jurist) opened the door to an increasing role for the presidency in a post-Khamenei Islamic Re-
public. 
Any change in the leadership structure of the Islamic Republic would profoundly affect deterrence 
calculations. As President Ahmadinejad’s tenure shows, the position of president is open to candi-
dates with extreme views. Although it is impossible to predict who will be the next supreme leader, 
the pool from which he will come is known and can be analyzed. It is much more difficult to deter-
mine the pool of potential presidents two or three elections into the future—Mir Hossein Mousavi, 
for instance, was a most unlikely candidate to become President Ahmadinejad’s primary opponent in 
this most recent election. 
It is worth noting, on the other hand, that Ayatollah Khamenei was a most unlikely selection to 
succeed Ayatollah Khomeini. Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri was Khomeini’s designated successor 
until he fell from favor. At the time of Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, Ayatollah Rafsanjani appeared 
the most powerful cleric; Khamenei, in fact, had not even achieved the religious level of ayatollah, 
being merely a hojjat-ol Eslam at the time of his elevation (hojjat-ol Eslam is the clerical rank below 
ayatollah in Shia Islam). 
All of which is to say that it is difficult to predict who will lead the Islamic Republic over the com-
ing decade, let alone decades. Nor is it possible to state with certainty that the ruler or rulers will have 
a worldview with definable limits. A number of very pragmatic revolutionaries who would likely be 
as open to deterrence as any leader of a fundamentally ideological state are strong candidates. But so 
are a number of leaders with apocalyptic worldviews, such as President Ahmadinejad. 
This situation contrasts strongly with the nature of Soviet leadership during the Cold War. Al-
though there was actually an apocalyptic strain of thinking even within the Soviet ruling elite, the na-
ture of the post-Stalin Soviet oligarchy powerfully militated against extremes. The essence of Cold 
War Soviet leadership was collective decision-making. Communist Party general secretary Nikita 
Khrushchev was removed from power by the Politburo in 1964 not simply for his reckless 
brinksmanship during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but also for having moved beyond the realm of pri-
mus inter pares that the post-Stalin Politburo members had agreed would be the general secretary’s 
role.  
The tenures of Leonid Brezhnev, Yurii Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, and Mikhail Gorba-
chev, therefore, were all marked by a determined effort on the part of the Politburo to retain an oli-
garchic style of rule. In such a system, marked by deliberation and the search for consensus among an 
elite that was conservative to begin with, extremes were rare. Soviet-American crises over the dec-
ades show the evolution of this oligarchic conservatism: the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 resulted 
from an aggressive action by Khrushchev aimed at changing the correlation of nuclear forces dramat-
ically through a coup-de-main. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which prompted the next 
most serious crisis in relations, was a reflexive and defensive action undertaken largely out of fear of 
the consequences of the failure of the socialist regime that had taken power in Kabul in 1978 but 
seemed unable to hold onto it. The last serious Cold War crisis resulted from the shooting down of 
Korean Air flight 007 in 1983, apparently a mistake made by lower-level officials that led to panic in 
the Kremlin at the thought of how President Ronald Reagan might react. Subsequent Cold War cris-
es—the attack on Tbilisi in 1989, the invasion of the Baltic States in 1991, and so on—were all despe-
rate attempts to keep the Soviet Union together. 
It is not possible to argue by analogy, however, that the Islamic Republic will inevitably develop in-
to a similarly conservative oligarchy. It is not now an oligarchy in the Soviet sense—the supreme 
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leader acts to balance competing power blocs against one another while remaining above the fray 
(something he notably failed to do in the most recent elections, however, possibly increasing the odds 
that his successor will not be a single person). His control over Iranian foreign policy, in particular, 
appears to be almost absolute, whereas in the Soviet model foreign policy required at least as much 
elite consensus as domestic policy did. Depending on the future development of the regime, the Is-
lamic Republic may become a more oligarchic system, but it may also become more autocratic if a 
strong president backed by the IRGC eclipses the clerical elite. It is, in other words, simply too soon 
to tell how the Islamic Republic will be ruled, who will rule it, and whether there will be any structural 
imperative to ensure that it will be deterrable. 
Visions of the Apocalypse 
American political and analytical elites have a hard time accepting the notion that there might be Ira-
nian leaders with truly apocalyptic world views, or that such views could matter in major decisions. 
There is no need to argue this point on the basis of Islam or the peculiarities of Shi’ism. Apocalyptic 
visions have emerged in at least three modern Western regimes in the past century, leading one of 
them truly to an apocalypse. 
Post–World War I Germany was the first to see the rise of real apocalyptic thinking. The original 
intellectual leaders were Erich Ludendorff and Joachim von Stülpnagel, not Adolf Hitler. Their no-
tion, based on the dire circumstances of a nation they believed should be dominant, was that Germa-
ny would triumph in a real global struggle risking all for all, and that failure and complete destruction 
in such a conflict would be more honorable and worthy than muddling along as a third-rate power. 
As Stülpnagel said in 1923, Germany must mobilize all of its resources to “guarantee us either victo-
ry or destruction together with the enemy.” Their ideas perhaps inspired or simply merged with Hit-
ler’s own apocalyptic visions. When Hitler was chancellor in the early and mid-1930s, these apoca-
lyptic visions did not seem important to many—and the West believed that Germany and Hitler was 
deterrable. And they may have been, although probably not in the long run. But the successes that 
Hitler achieved in gamble after gamble persuaded him that he really had destiny in his grasp. The de-
cisive moment, from this perspective, was Hitler’s order to invade Czechoslovakia, taken against the 
advice of his military chief of staff, who represented the pragmatist view of the German military. Hit-
ler’s success in this endeavor led him to launch Germany on the course toward a real apocalypse. 
 The Soviet Union also had its share of apocalyptic thinkers, even during the nuclear age. The final 
conflict Karl Marx predicted, in which socialism would overwhelm and destroy capitalism, appealed 
to some senior Soviet leaders more than the cautious aggression of Stalin and his heirs. Some of them 
saw in nuclear war the possibility to trigger and win this final conflict once and for all. They believed 
that the unavoidable mass casualties in such a war would be worth it to ensure the final destruction of 
capitalism, which they held to be the source of all human conflict. They argued that the Soviet Union 
had suffered twenty million casualties during World War II and not only survived, but gained in pow-
er and ability to advance the socialist cause. They were willing (in principle) to contemplate the fifty 
or one hundred million casualties they believed might ensue from a nuclear exchange if the benefit 
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were ending human strife forever. Soviet apocalyptic thinkers, fortunately, never persuaded their 
colleagues, and the oligarchic nature of the system kept them from implementing their theories. But 
that strain of thought was present and was more dangerous to the stability of the nuclear “balance of 
terror” than many in the West imagined then or since. 
Does Mahmoud Ahmadinejad find the prospect of nuclear exchange with Israel appealing because 
he believes it will bring about the return of the twelfth imam and the day of judgment? Some of his 
statements would suggest that he might. Hitherto, it has been the position of Western analysts that it 
does not matter too much because of his limited influence in Iranian foreign policy and the pragmat-
ism of a supreme leader who does not seem to share his vision. But Ahmadinejad is not the only Ira-
nian leader with an apocalyptic worldview. Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi represents that view among the 
clerical elite, and both men have followings and supporters among their respective bases. The wedge 
of Iranian leaders who hold such views is probably very small, but so it was also in Germany in the 
1930s. The impossibility of predicting exactly what the structure of the Islamic Republic will be, let 
alone who will lead it, and the fact that one leader with an apocalyptic worldview has already made it 
to the presidency is grounds for concern. 
Once again, it is not possible or appropriate to argue that an apocalyptic strain of thought will lead 
the Islamic Republic to seek or even accept nuclear war. Neither, however, is it possible to demon-
strate with confidence that any kind of structural limitations within the regime or its process of se-
lecting leaders will exclude such a possibility. Therefore, it is impossible to assess with confidence 
that future leaders of the Islamic Republic will be deterrable even if present ones are. 
Deterring What? 
What would the objective of an American deterrence strategy be? Is the aim simply to deter the Is-
lamic Republic from attacking the United States with nuclear weapons? Would the United States also 
seek to deter Iran from attacking Europe with nuclear weapons? Israel? Saudi Arabia? Is the objective 
to deter Iran from using its weapons at all? These questions are directly related to the danger of the 
rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East: If the United States cannot credibly deter 
Iran from attacking Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, or any other state in the region, then the likelihood 
of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East increases dramatically. 
The record of using a “nuclear umbrella” to prevent allies from acquiring their own weapons is 
spotty. During the Cold War, both Great Britain and France felt that American nuclear predomin-
ance was not sufficient protection for them, and both developed independent nuclear forces that they 
retain to this day. Germany and Japan did not do so, but the situation was rather different for them—
after World War II any attempt by either state to acquire nuclear weapons would have created a glob-
al crisis. Nor was America’s demonstrated commitment to Israel sufficient to convince Tel Aviv to 
refrain from acquiring a nuclear arsenal. Will the United States offer treaty guarantees to Saudi Ara-
bia, Egypt, the Gulf States, and Israel similar to those that failed to persuade Britain and France to 
remain weapons-free? It seems most unlikely. 
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It is far from clear, in fact, that the United States would extend a “nuclear umbrella” over any re-
gional state if it means that the United States would undertake to use its own nuclear weapons against 
Iran in retaliation for an Iranian nuclear attack on a third party. Persuading the Islamic Republic that 
the United States would nuke Tehran if Tel Aviv were attacked could be extremely difficult. Persuad-
ing the Israelis that a U.S. statement of policy will deter Iran from attacking Tel Aviv would be almost 
impossible. The recently released U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has added legalistic complexi-
ty and uncertainty to the value of any American nuclear umbrella, moreover. Although the NPR 
states that “the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear 
weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners,” it also declares 
that “the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons 
states that are party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuc-
lear nonproliferation obligations.” It adds, “Yet that does not mean that our willingness to use nuclear 
weapons against countries not covered by the new assurance has in any way increased. Indeed, the 
United States wishes to stress that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme cir-
cumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” These state-
ments are compatible with a tacit or declarative policy of providing a nuclear umbrella to partners in 
the Middle East. They are, however, significantly weaker than the alliance commitments and explicit 
statements of willingness to use nuclear force in defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) allies that failed to persuade Britain and France to remain nonnuclear. At issue is not so 
much the Obama administration’s intentions, but rather the way that regional actors are likely to 
perceive those intentions. 
Israel will certainly rely on its own nuclear forces to deter an Iranian strike. But the development 
and growth of an Iranian nuclear capability will likely generate an Israeli-Iranian arms race, if nothing 
else. Moreover, it is important to recall that the “stability” of Cold War deterrence was not so sta-
ble—missiles on both sides were kept constantly ready and the time leaders expected to have to de-
cide whether or not to strike first or retaliate was reckoned in minutes. Introducing what Cold War 
strategist Albert Wohlstetter called “the delicate balance of terror” into the Middle East should give 
the United States pause.  
Among other things, the challenge of deterrence between two blocs with centrally coordinated 
military decision-making (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) was orders of magnitude more manageable 
than the problem of managing multiple nuclear states that neither coordinate with nor trust one 
another. The plausibility of multipolar nuclear deterrence requires, at a minimum, much more careful 
scrutiny than it has hitherto received. 
In particular, the notion that the United States can rely on a doctrine of mutual assured destruction 
(MAD) to deter Iran as it did the Soviet Union is extremely problematic. To begin with, the Soviets 
never actually accepted that doctrine, relying instead on a rational calculus of potential costs, conse-
quences, and benefits that never tipped them in favor of using nuclear force. Even the United States 
did not always accept or rely on this doctrine, particularly in the early days of the Cold War. On the 
contrary, President Eisenhower developed the concept of “massive retaliation” to take advantage of 
America’s nuclear arsenal to save money on conventional forces. According to that doctrine, the 
United States would respond with overwhelming nuclear force to any conventional or nuclear threat 
to America or its allies. This doctrine led to a dilemma when the People’s Republic of China threat-
ened two small islands off its coast, Quesmoy and Matsu, and the Eisenhower administration had to 
wrestle with the question of its willingness to launch a nuclear attack in response. Throughout the 
 7 
 
Cold War, the United States refused to announce a doctrine of “no first use” of nuclear weapons be-
cause the balance of conventional forces in Europe favored the Soviets.  
Still another problem with applying Cold War deterrence theory to present-day or future Iran is 
the basic requirement in that theory that both sides engage in a mutually comprehensible rational 
calculus, and that both sides can clearly communicate their intentions to one another. Iranian actions 
are most likely rational—to the leadership of the Islamic Republic. But rationality is not simply a logi-
cal mode of thought. It is a logical mode of thought based on a given understanding of the world as 
perceived by the thinker. If two leaders reason logically from different perceptions of reality, one will 
find the other’s reasoning irrational despite its internal logic.  
There is good reason to believe that the leadership of the Islamic Republic does not share a com-
mon picture of the world with American leaders. American policymakers, even those who see the 
Islamic Republic in a relatively sympathetic light, often find the behavior of Iran’s leaders erratic and 
inexplicable. Iranian leaders, for their part, continually refer to various conspiracy theories and make 
assertions about the United States and its activities that seem outlandish to most analysts. Are the 
Iranians insane or irrational? Probably not—but their rationality, or at least, the perceptual basis for 
it, seems to be different from that of the United States. 
That difference in perception of the world, common between countries separated by a wide ideo-
logical gulf, generates enormous difficulties in communication. Some analysts will leap to point out 
that the American “failure” to reestablish diplomatic relations with Iran is the cause of these commu-
nications difficulties, or at least a major contributor. Setting aside the fact that it is by no means clear 
that the current Iranian regime desires to reestablish relations with the United States, this mechanical 
issue is not the sum of the problem. America’s European allies, after all, have full diplomatic relations 
with Iran. They have also repeatedly found themselves baffled by the actions and statements of the 
Islamic Republic. Reestablishing formal relations with Iran is rather like setting up a telephone line 
between two people who do not speak the same language—the improvement in the technical ability 
to communicate does not immediately translate into an ability to achieve mutual comprehension. 
The questions of rationality and communication are critical to the issue of deterrence. Any deter-
rence strategy relies on a state’s ability to clearly communicate the limits of its tolerance and to signal 
to the potential adversary when those limits are being approached. It must also be able to communi-
cate clearly when attempting to manage or deescalate a crisis. It is not inconceivable that the United 
States might manage to both comprehend the rationality of Iran’s leaders and develop clear methods 
of communicating intentions and perceptions, but it has not managed to do so yet. 
Nonnuclear Deterrence 
The Islamic Republic has neither the capability nor the doctrine to conduct offensive conventional 
ground operations, so deterring its invasion of its neighbors is not really an operative issue. It does 
have a growing capability to conduct air and missile strikes against its neighbors and regional states. It 
also has significant capability to encourage proxy groups to conduct terrorism, both in the region and 
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globally. And it has an undefined capability to conduct terrorist attacks globally using its own forces 
(principally the Qods Force, the IRGC, and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, or MOIS). 
The West’s record of deterring the Islamic Republic from nonnuclear military undertakings over 
the past three decades has been spotty at best. The regime was founded on an act of war against the 
United States (the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and its inhabitants). Since then, Iran has 
supported Hezbollah in Lebanon; conducted terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia (Khobar Towers) and 
Latin America (Buenos Aires); armed, trained, and facilitated both terrorists and insurgents in Iraq 
and Afghanistan; supported Hamas and Palestinian Islamic jihad; and conducted offensive naval op-
erations in the Persian Gulf. It has done all of this in spite of American and sometimes international 
sanctions, appeals, offers to negotiate, and threats to attack. 
Would nuclear weapons make it easier to deter the Islamic Republic from conducting such opera-
tions? Some have argued that the Islamic Republic seeks nuclear weapons out of fear of the American 
regime change military operation that is never quite “taken off the table.” One could extrapolate from 
that argument that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would reassure the regime and make it less 
likely to support aggressive undertakings throughout the region or the world. 
The trouble with that argument is that it requires dismissing the ideological basis of the regime and 
all of the rhetoric of successive Iranian leaders. The Islamic Republic was established as a revolutio-
nary state in the Muslim world whose aim was to reestablish the true faith for all Muslims. The crea-
tion of the Qods Force (Jerusalem Force) in the 1980s was an example of this messianism put into 
practice, just as the Communist International was an example of early Soviet messianism. The state-
ments of Iranian leaders, moreover, show not fear of the United States but rather a desire to be rec-
ognized as a hegemonic or at least a leading power in the Middle East (broadly defined to include 
Afghanistan). 
It is possible to distinguish the two motivations in Iranian statements and actions. When the Bush 
administration seemed to be considering a military option, the Islamic Republic often responded 
with missile launches, military exercises designed to demonstrate its ability to withstand U.S. air at-
tacks, and bombastic statements about its ability to defeat the United States using asymmetric com-
bat methods. Such statements were most likely reactions stemming from fear of a U.S. strike, and 
they were intended to deter such an attack. One might imagine, if tenuously, that an Islamic Republic 
reassured by possessing nuclear weapons would be less prone to such statements and actions—but 
those statements and actions have been a tiny part of the Islamic Republic’s contribution to regional 
instability. 
The greater part of Iranian interventions abroad have positive rather than defensive purposes 
from Tehran’s perspective. The Islamic Republic was founded on the basis of profound anti-
Semitism and anti-Zionism, and it supports proxies around Israel whose aim is to threaten Israel and, 
periodically, attack it. Rivalry and conflict between Iran and Iraq are longstanding, so the Islamic Re-
public has supported proxies since 2003 whose aim it is to establish a government in Baghdad that is 
not only Shia (that was accomplished in 2004 and again in 2005–2006 with the seating of the gov-
ernment of Nuri Kemal al Maliki) but is also conducive to the interests of the Islamic Republic. Iran 
attacks U.S. interests (and occasionally forces and individuals) in the Persian Gulf region not simply 
because it sees them as a threat, but also because the Islamic Republic defines the United States as the 
heir to the British tradition of colonialism and seeks to expel the United States, the UK, and all other 
foreign powers from the region. A nuclear Islamic Republic will not lose these interests or objectives. 
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On the contrary, it will very likely be encouraged to take greater risks in pursuing them, believing that 
it is safer from American or Israeli retaliation. 
Conclusion 
The question of deterring a nuclear Iran arises from a recognition of the difficulty (or improbability) 
of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. There is a strong desire in some circles to argue 
that Iran can be deterred and contained like the Soviet Union was in order to make the prospect of a 
nuclear Iran more comfortable, and to reduce the need for the painful consideration of the price the 
world might pay for allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. It may be that there is no way to stop 
the Islamic Republic from acquiring such weapons. It may be that the price of attempting to do so is 
too high. It does not follow, however, that the world can be comfortable with the prospect of a nuc-
lear Iran because it can be deterred. 
Too much of the discussion focuses either on the current Iranian leadership—especially the su-
preme leader—or on generalizations about the pragmatism of most members of the ruling elite in 
Tehran. The trouble is that once the Islamic Republic acquires nuclear weapons, it has them indefi-
nitely. Therefore, even if it is decided that the current leadership can be deterred, the United States 
must seriously consider the kind of danger accepting the nuclearization of the Islamic Republic, to 
say nothing of the region, will pose to coming generations. There is simply no basis to argue with any 
confidence that subsequent regimes in Tehran will or will not be deterrable. A strategy toward the 
Islamic Republic that relies on deterring it after it has obtained nuclear weapons, therefore, will be a 
strategy based on wishful thinking. 
 
 
